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Abstract
Compared with previous crises few banks failed as a result of the U.S. financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. We investigate the role played by managerial efficiency in 
the non-systemic bank failures during the crisis. During previous waves of bank 
failures, cost-inefficient banks and banks with relatively less capital or low-qua-
lity assets were more likely to fail. Using data from 2001 to 2010, we show that 
profit inefficiency—our proxy for managerial inefficiency— is a robust predictor 
of bank failures while cost inefficiency is unrelated to them. In addition, capital 
adequacy lost importance in predicting non-systemic bank failures during the 
crisis while loan quality remained a strong predictor. Our results suggest that 
profit efficiency can be an important managerial indicator in monitoring banks.
Resumen
En comparación con crisis previas, pocos bancos quebraron como resultado de la 
crisis financiera estadounidense de 2007-2009. En el presente artículo se inves-
tiga el papel que la eficiencia en la gestión bancaria jugó en la quiebra de bancos 
comerciales considerados no-sistémicos. Durante las olas de quiebras bancarias 
anteriores, los bancos ineficientes en costos y con baja capitalización o con activos 
de baja calidad tenían una mayor probabilidad de quebrar. Usando datos entre 
2001 y 2010, en este artículo se utiliza la eficiencia en beneficios para capturar 
la eficiencia en la gestión bancaria. Se encuentra que la eficiencia en beneficios 
es un predictor robusto de la probabilidad de que un banco quiebre. Contrario 
a la literatura previa, se encuentra que la eficiencia en costos no lo es. Además, 
la capitalización bancaria perdió poder predictivo en la probabilidad de quiebra 
mientras que la calidad de los préstamos aún conserva un alto poder predictivo. 
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Los resultados presentados sugieren que la eficiencia en beneficios puede ser un indicador importante 
en la supervisión y el monitoreo de los bancos. 
1. Introduction
During and immediately after the 2007-2009 U.S. financial crisis, 322 U.S. commercial banks failed. 
The estimated loss for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was $86 billion. Both the 
number of bank failures and their associated cost increased tenfold compared to the years between 
2000 and 2007. From 1980 to 1989, 1,467 U.S. commercial banks failed (estimated cost $62 billion) 
and from 1990 to 1999 this number was 436 (estimated cost $7 billion)1. Despite the severity of the 
recent crisis, the number of bank failures was low compared to previous crisis episodes. The natural 
question arising from these facts is what was different this time around.
In the U.S. the FDIC manages bank failures and is usually appointed as a receiver for failing banks. 
The narratives presented in the Material Loss and In-Depth Reviews (MLIR) conducted by the FDIC 
Office of Inspector General indicate that a bank fails mainly because the bank has: 1) inadequate cor-
porate governance; 2) weak risk management; 3) lack of risk diversification/lending concentration; 4) 
deteriorating financial conditions; and 5) insufficient capital to continue sound operations2. The risk 
management manual of examination policies of the FDIC (the FDIC closure guidelines, henceforth), 
includes six factors to assess the soundness of supervised banks: capital adequacy, asset quality, 
managerial practices, earnings quality, liquidity position, and sensitivity to market risk. These six 
factors are commonly known by the acronym CAMELS. By construction, the proxies for CAMELS 
factors have high explanatory power regarding the probability of bank failures in the U.S. since the 
FDIC recommends bank closures or prompt corrective actions based on them. Not surprisingly, a 
robust finding in the academic literature is that CAMELS components constitute the main factors 
influencing the probability that a bank fails (e.g. Cole and Gunther 1995; Wheelock and Wilson 2000; 
Cole and White 2012).
According to the FDIC, “the quality of management is probably the single most important element 
in the successful operation of a bank” (FDIC guidelines, 2005, p. 4.1.1). However, out of the six CA-
MELS factors, the managerial component is usually overlooked in the literature since the assessment 
of managerial practices is not readily amenable to econometric or statistical analysis, in part, because 
the definition of managerial practices is broad and vague.
In economics, efficiency is defined broadly as the ratio between outputs and inputs. It describes 
a relationship between ends and means and is measured by comparing their relative values, Heyne 
(2008). Consistent with this definition, managerial efficiency can be defined as the ability to achieve 
the firm’s objectives (ends) using the minimum level of resources (means). Ideally, it can be measured 
by comparing the value of resources used with the value of the outputs produced. However, in applied 
work this is a difficult task. Bates and Sykes (1962) argue that managerial efficiency necessarily should 
be reflected in the profitability of firms: more managerial-efficient firms should be more profitable. 
Jovanovic (1982) states that in a market economy profits represent the reward for greater managerial 
efficiency. Following Bates and Sykes and Jovanovic, we measure managerial efficiency using profit 
efficiency as a proxy. Profit efficiency is a financial performance measure of the distance between 
1 Data on commercial banks’ failure are available at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/
index.asp).
2 See (Ragalevsky and Ricardi, 2009) and the MLIR reports at https://www.fdicig.gov/mlr.shtml. The MLIR are conducted only when the 
FDIC insurance funds suffer material losses as a consequence of a bank failure. 
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actual profit and the best practice frontier. It captures how efficiently a bank can extract profits from 
the resources deployed in its operations (see Berger and Mester 1997; Kumbhakar and Lovell 2003; 
Akhigbe and McNulty 2003, 2005)3.
To our knowledge, there are only two directly related papers to our work (Wheelock and Wilson 
2000 and Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch 2016). Wheelock and Wilson argue that management quality 
is difficult to measure directly since it can take several forms. They favor the use of cost and technical 
efficiency measures as proxies for managerial quality4. They find that both proxies are statistically 
and economically significant predictors of bank failures in the U.S. Most recently, Berger et al. tackles 
the difficult issue of establishing if a banks’ corporate governance system is an important predictor of 
bank failures in the U.S. They investigate the impact of bank ownership and management structures 
on the probability of bank failure. They find that a bank’s ownership structure strongly influences 
the probability of bank failures.
We contribute to the financial literature on bank failure and complement the existing studies by 
showing that profit efficiency, our proxy for the quality of banks’ managerial practices, strongly 
influ- ences the probability that a bank survives the U.S. Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 . We find that 
profit inefficiency—arguably the most important measure of managerial inefficiency—is a robust 
predictor of bank failures5. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) present empirical evidence indicating that 
cost effi- ciency positively influenced the survival probability of U.S. commercial banks. Our findings 
indicate that cost efficiency played no direct role on the survival probability of banks during the last 
financial crisis. In contrast to Moore and Seamans (2013) and traditional wisdom, our estimates show 
that the capital adequacy of banks is not a robust predictor of banks’ survival during the last crisis. 
However, loan quality and bank profitability remain strong predictors. Our results suggest that banks’ 
regulators should focus on loan quality and loan mix in monitoring the soundness of banks and that 
banks’ profit efficiency can be an important managerial indicator in monitoring banks.
We use standard hazard regression models to estimate the conditional probability of bank failures. 
Namely, we show how efficiency and traditional proxies for bank failure affect this probability. Unlike 
the standard classification models (Logit or Probit), hazard models account for incompletely-observed 
lifespans of banks surviving past the sample period. Post-crisis studies exclusively use Logit models 
to model bank failures (e.g. DeYoung and Torna 2013, Cole and White 2012, Berger et al. 2016). Our 
results offer a robustness check to their results.
Our main hypothesis is that after accounting for traditional factors influencing bank failure, man- 
agerial efficiency—as captured by profit efficiency—should be negatively correlated with banks’ failure 
probability as relatively more profit-efficient banks should be less likely to fail, Amel and Prager (2013). 
We find that banks’ profit efficiency has independent explanatory power and negatively influences 
the probability of bank failures: the higher the profit efficiency of a bank, the lower its probability of 
failure. In contrast to previous studies (e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 2000), we find that cost efficiency 
3 We acknowledge that profit efficiency is an imperfect proxy for managerial efficiency. However, according to the managerial 
efficiency theory of Jovanovic (1982), more efficient firms are more profitable and more likely to survive. Thus, profit efficiency and 
managerial efficiency should be highly correlated.
4 Cost efficiency measures the ratio between actual and minimum total variable costs which are estimated using standard stochastic 
frontier techniques, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003). Technical efficiency measures the ratio between actual and minimum inputs for 
producing a given level of outputs. 
5 In the data revenue and cost efficiencies are negatively correlated (Rogers, 1998). Thus, profit efficiency is potentially a better 
measure of overall managerial efficiency than revenue and cost efficiencies alone.
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measures are unrelated to bank failures. The results are robust to the inclusion of different sets of 
control variables and the use of different model specifications. As in Wheelock and Wilson (2000), 
we find that less diversified banks, as measured by loan-to-asset ratios, are more likely to fail. Thus, 
recent regulatory measures intended to limit banks’ ability to carry out non-traditional activities may 
actually increase the likelihood of bank failures. In addition, the ratio of real estate and commercial 
loans to total loans is positively related to bank failures. Banks with low-quality loans, as measured 
by non-performing loans and loan loss provisions, are also more likely to fail.
An interesting result is that banks that rely on deposits as a major source of loan funding have 
a higher probability of failure. This result may indicate that deposit insurance leads banks to take 
on more risk, an explanation consistent with Wheelock and Wilson (1995) and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002). Further, after accounting for the above factors and earnings quality (measured 
using returns on assets or return on equity), we show that leverage, asset size, and off-balance sheet 
activities are unrelated to bank failures. This latter finding may imply that off-balance sheet activities 
help banks to diversify their portfolio and do not increase their risk of failure.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 presents the basic 
model and variables and describes the data; Section 4 reports the empirical results; Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
The recent U.S. financial crisis of 2008-2009 spurred research on the determinants of the failures of 
systemically-important banks—systemic banks. This new research focuses on the interconnectedness 
of modern banking systems and its effects on bank stability and the interconnection with key factors 
like regulatory framework, monetary policy, bank leverage, capital requirements, bank size, shared risk 
exposure, liquidity, and funding sources, among others. (Glasserman and Young 2016, Brunnermeier 
and Sannikov 2014, Gorton and Metrick 2012, Lo 2012, Tirole 2011, Brunnermeier 2009, Hoshi 2011). 
As a consequence, our understanding of such matters as systemic risk, financial instability, and mo-
netary and regulatory policy regimes improved in recent years. However, the causes and determinants 
of non- systemic bank failures stemming from the crisis are not yet well understood (DeYoung and 
Torna 2013, Cole and White 2012). In this section, we review the post-crisis literature on why U.S. 
commercial banks failed during the crisis and compare its main results to the pre-crisis evidence.
Given that the U.S. financial crisis was triggered by a mortgage default crisis and the subsequent 
bad performance of mortgage-backed securities (Adelino, Schoar and Severino 2016, Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert 2011, Mian and Sufi 2009), the post-crisis literature focuses on three main topics: 
i) the relation between bank failures and their exposure to the real estate market—in particular, to 
subprime and non-household borrowers (Antoniades 2015, Cole and White 2012); ii) the role played 
by non- traditional banking activities; and iii) the relation of bank failures to bank characteristics—as 
measured by CAMELS factors—and economic fundamentals.
One of the first papers investigating why U.S. commercial banks failed during the crisis is Cole and 
White (2012). They investigate the ability of CAMELS components and measures of banks’ real estate 
investment to predict bank failures during the crisis. They find that after accounting for CAMELS 
components, banks’ exposure to residential mortgage-based securities (RMBS) has no explanatory 
power in predicting non-systemic bank failures. Higher levels of capital, better asset quality, higher 
earnings, and more liquidity make banks less likely to fail. However, the exposure to the real estate 
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market in general was associated with a higher probability of failure. These results are broadly con-
sistent with those in Oliveira, Martins and Brandao (2015) and Li (2013).
The results in Cole and White (2012) support the main finding of the pre-crisis literature: CAMELS 
components are robust predictors of bank failures (Whalen 1991, Cole and Gunther 1995, Wheelock 
and Wilson 2000, Kolari, Glennon, Shin and Caputo 2002, Estrella, Park and Peristiani 2000, DeY- 
oung 2003). In a related paper, Shaffer (2012) investigate the relative importance of CAMELS com- 
ponents in determining bank-failure probabilities during the crisis and compare these differences to 
the pre-crisis literature. They find that the risk of bank failure was more sensitive to non-performing 
loans and banks’ profitability in 2008 than in the 1980s. The effect of leverage and capital adequacy 
seems to have diminished over time.
Non-traditional banking activities like securities brokerage, insurance sales, venture capital, in- 
vestment banking and securitization figured prominently as contributing factors to the U.S. financial 
crisis. DeYoung and Torna (2013) investigate the role of such activities in predicting bank failures 
during and in the aftermath of the crisis. They find that pure-fee based non-traditional activities 
(e.g., securities brokerages and insurance sales) reduce the probability of bank failures. Asset-based 
non-traditional activities (e.g., venture capital, investment banking, and securitization) increase it. 
DeYoung and Torna show that banks’ risk-taking through non-traditional activities is associated 
with greater risk-taking in their traditional lines of business. Their results suggest that managerial 
decisions play an important role in determining the riskiness of banks’ activities and that other soft 
factors (e.g., bank ownership, management efficiency, and corporate governance in general) may 
play an important role in influencing bank failures.
Other researchers investigate how local economic conditions relate to the survival and failure of 
banks. According to Cebula (2010), non-systemic bank failures between 1970 and 2007 were linked 
to fundamental economic factors (e.g. unemployment rate, bank’s funding costs, stock market uncer-
tainty, regulatory changes, and loan quality). Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) show that most bank 
failures in the 1980s and early 1990s occurred in U.S. regions experiencing unusual economic distress. 
Regulatory constraints seem to have played an important role as banks were unable to geographically 
diversify their risk. Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) investigate the role of local economic conditions 
in bank failures during the U.S. financial crisis. They find that bank failure rates were higher in sta-
tes with severely-deteriorated economic conditions. Thus, in spite of the lifting of most intra-states 
regulatory constraints between 1995 and 2005, local economic conditions still played an important 
role in determining the survival probability of banks.
Other studies investigate the role of individual CAMELS components on the probability of bank 
failures. Hambusch and Shaffer (2016), for instance, propose an early warning model using bank lever- 
age as the main determinant of bank failures. They show that their model performs well in predicting 
bank failure in normal times but not during economic downturns or crisis episodes, highlighting the 
limitations inherent in focusing on only some CAMELS components to predict bank failures.
Bologna (2015) investigate the role of funding structure and funding mix in predicting bank 
failures during the crisis (2008-2009). They use the loan-to-deposit ratio as a proxy for banks’ 
funding structure. Consistent with empirical and theoretical arguments regarding the superiority 
of deposit funding over non-deposit funding, they find that bank failures are positively related to 
banks’ reliance on non-deposit funding and that the larger the share of non-deposit funding, the 
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higher the probability of failure. These results are similar to those reported by Schaeck (2008) and 
Miller, Olson and Yeager (2015).
None of the above-mentioned studies deal with the issue of how managerial efficiency affects the 
probability of a bank failure, which is the focus of the present paper. The literature regarding these 
effects is scant and by now dated. The seminal paper in this line of research is Wheelock and Wilson 
(2000). Using data from 1984 to 1993 and after controlling for traditional CAMELS factors, they find 
that managerial efficiency, as measured by cost and technical efficiency, was a robust predictor of 
bank survival probabilities. More recently, Berger et al. (2016) shed some light on why low managerial 
efficiency may be associated with lower rates of bank survival. It turns out that bank ownership, and 
in particular, the stakes in the banks, determines the risk-taking of lower-level management and, 
ultimately, bank failures. They present evidence that bank failure probabilities increase when chief 
officers and lower-level management incentives are aligned in this way.
In a related managerial paper, Gilbert, Meyer and Fuchs (2013) investigate what distinguishes 
thriving U.S. community banks. They define thriving banks as those that were able to maintain a 
high supervisory rating during the crisis (2006 to 2011). Supervisory ratings capture the overall 
performance of banks with respect to the CAMELS components. In addition to hard information 
(e.g. financial ratios), supervisory ratings also include soft information regarding banks’ managerial 
quality. Gilbert et al. (2013) analyze the differences between the thriving banks and the “surviving 
banks”—i.e., those that did not fail but maintained a low supervisory rating. They interviewed the 
leaders of a sample of thriving banks to investigate how they were able to outperform their peers 
during the crisis. They find that managers of thriving banks maintained a strong commitment to 
conservative lending practices. However, thriving banks follow different business plans to achieve 
their objectives. No single model seems to be able to capture the diversity of these banks’ business 
strategies or explain their success.
3. Methodology
In our analysis we estimate the time-to-failure probability of U.S. commercial banks using standard 
hazard model regressions. We focus on testing if managerial efficiency measures commonly used in 
the literature (e.g., profit, cost, and revenue efficiency) have independent explanatory power to predict 
bank failures. To measure managerial efficiency we favor the use of a profit efficiency measure over 
cost or revenue efficiency measures taken in isolation. In this section, we explain the econometric 
methods used to estimate managerial efficiency and time-to-failure probabilities.
We follow Wheelock and Wilson (2000) in modeling the time-to-failure of U.S. banks. We use 
Cox (1972) proportional-hazard models with time-varying covariates6.We favor the use of hazard 
models over static classification models (e.g. Probit and Logit models) for several reasons. First, hazard 
models can control for the time a bank is at risk of failure. Static models give biased and inconsistent 
probabilities of failure given that they ignore that banks change over time. Second, hazard models 
incorporate the panel structure of the data and accommodate bank-specific and industry or macro-
economic covariates. Third, hazard models outperform static models in out-of-sample forecasting 
(See Shumway 2001, Cole and Wu 2009, and Demyanyk and Hasan 2010 for details)7. 
6 For a detailed account of the models’ estimation see (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000, p. 136)
7 Cole and Wu (2009) report that a simple logit model performs better in predicting recent bank failures in the U.S.. As a robustness 
check, we also include results from logit regressions.
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We use four measures to proxy for bank managerial efficiency. We estimate profit and revenue 
efficiencies using the non-standard profit function framework of Humphrey and Pulley (1997) and 
estimate cost efficiency using a cost function, which is standard in the literature8. We also estimatea 
composite profit efficiency measure following Restrepo-Tobon and Kumhakar (2011). This measure 
is a profit efficiency measure that captures both revenue and cost efficiency. It differs from the 
traditional profit efficiency measure in that it is computed from separate measures of revenue and 
cost efficiencies rather than from a profit function. Previous studies focus on cost and technical effi-
ciency. For instance, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) use three measures of efficiency: cost efficiency, 
input-oriented technical efficiency, and output-oriented technical efficiency9. We believe that profit 
efficiency provides a superior measure of efficiency over these measures since it encompasses all 
of them in a single measure.
We follow Humphrey and Pulley (1997) and assume that banks maximize profits, 
П = R − C =∑m pm ym − ∑ j w j x j , subject to technological and market constraints, where pm , m = 1, • • • , M are 
the prices for the corresponding vector of output quantities y and w j , j = 1, • • • , J are the input prices for 
the corresponding vector of input quantities xj . We model the bank’ technology using the transforma-
tion function, A f (y, Ɵ • x) = 1. The market constraints are modeled using the price possibility frontier 
(PPF), g (ŋ • p, w, z) = 1, where z capture any bank characteristic that influences its pricing strategies 
other than prices and outputs. g (•) captures the ability of banks to set output prices for given input 
prices conditional on banks technology. It is analogous to the transformation function. It is natural to 
think that banks take into account input prices in setting prices. However, their ability to charge diffe-
rential prices will depend on bank technology, therefore, the g (•) function should share some properties 
with the transformation function. It can be thought as the banks’ assessment of appropriate output 
prices given its technology and exogenously given input prices. Technically, it plays a similar role to 
the demand function in the classical monopoly model. Technical inefficiency (input-oriented) in the 
transformation function is introduced via 0≤Ɵ≤ 1. Similarly, price inefficiency (measured radially like 
technical inefficiency) shows the rate at which banks could increase their output prices (represented by 
ŋ ≥ 1) given market conditions10. The PPF could includeother exogenous variables that could potentially 
affect banks’ pricing policies.
Note that unlike in Berger, Humphrey and Pulley (1996) and Humphrey and Pulley (1997), Res-
trepo- Tobon and Kumhakar (2011) explicitly introduce price inefficiency (η ≥ 1) into the PPF. This 
allows the PPF to dispense with output quantities. In this case, the relation between input prices and 
output quantities, in the spirit of Berger et al. and Humphrey and Pulley, results naturally from the 
first order conditions of the profit maximization problem. We present details of the derivation of the 
profit, revenue, and cost efficiency measures in the Appendix.
We assume a flexible (translog) functional form for modelling the non-standard profit function, 
П (w, y), the non-standard revenue function R (w, y), and the standard cost function C (w, y). The 
translog function is widely used in the stochastic frontier literature, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003)11.
8 Revenue efficiency is defined as the ratio between actual revenues and maximum revenues. Maximum revenues are estimated using 
standard stochastic frontier techniques, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003). 
9 Input-oriented technical efficiency measures the proximity of current levels of inputs to their optimal levels. Output-oriented technical 
efficiency measures the proximity of the current level of outputs to their optimal levels (See Kumbhakar and Lovell 2003 for details)
10 Price inefficiency refers to setting output prices below their optimal level, which causes actual revenues to be below maximum revenues.
11 Translog functions are flexible, easy to calculate, and permit the imposition of homogeneity restrictions. Thus, we think they are a 
good starting point for our purposes.
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The econometric specification is:
(1)
In equation 1, Q represents either total profits, total revenues, or total variable costs. TL(w,y,t) corres-
ponds to the translog function of input prices (w), output quantities (y), and time (t). vi is a one-sided, 
half-normally distributed error term, N+(0, б 2), and єi represents a two-sided error term for each bank 
i = 1...N. The distributional properties of the one-sided error term have little impact on the estimated 
efficiency ranks (e.g. Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003)12. Thus, v = − lnγ, v = − ln ŋ , or v = lnƟ capture 
profit, revenue, or cost inefficiencies, respectively.
3.1 Data
As in Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Cole and White (2012), and Berger et al. (2016), we use the 
following variables to proxy for the traditional factors used in the FDIC’s CAMELS rating system:
• Capital Adequacy: Total Equity/Total Assets, and Tier 1 and 2 of Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio.
• Assets Quality: Total Loans/Total Assets, Real Estate Loans/Total Loans, Commercial and Indus- 
trial Loans/ Total Loans, Loan Loss Provision/Total Loans, Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans, 
Loan Loss Provision/Total Assets, and Non-Performing Loans/Total Assets, Off-balance Sheet 
Activities/Total Assets
• Earnings Quality: Net Income Before Taxes/Total Equity, Net Income Before Taxes/Total Assets.
• Funding Liquidity: Total Loans/Deposits.
• Liquidity Quality: Cash and Federal Funds Sold/Total Assets, Cash and Net Federal Funds/Total 
Assets.
• Other Factors: Log(Total Assets).
Profit, revenue, and cost efficiency estimation requires the specification of banks’ output and 
input prices. We follow the previous literature and define output and input quantities according to 
the balance-sheet approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977)13. We use quarterly data from 2001Q1 to 
2010Q4 from the Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) published by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago and from FDIC’s historical statistics. We include only insured commercial banks 
operating within the 50 U.S. States and the District of Columbia14.All nominal quantities are deflated 
using the 2005 Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumption from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(End of Year). We drop observations for which prices or output quantities have negative values. The 
12 See Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003 for details on estimating stochastic frontiers.
13 Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993); Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997); Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010); Liadaki and Gaganis 
(2010); Krasnikov, Jayachandran and Kumar (2009); Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, Mamatza- kis and Staikouras (2009); Akhigbe and Stevenson 
(2010) ; Delis and Tsionas (2009).
14 We exclude other institutions that operate under different structures like commercial banks primarily conducting credit card 
activities and Standalone Internet Banks (SAIB), etc.
lnQi= TL(w,y,t) + vi + єi
v
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dataset includes 48,999 observations of which 39,378 (corresponding to 6,767 banks) have complete 
information for the hazard model estimations. Bank failure data on commercial banks are available at 
the FDIC15.There are 302 failed banks in the sample with complete data. However, since the hazard 
model requires at least two observations per bank, the failed-bank sample is further reduced to 241 
observations.
4. Empirical Results
Tables I and II present the estimation results for the time-to-failure hazard model. The dependent 
variable is time-to-failure. A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in its accompanying variable 
is associated with an increase in the probability of failure. Each column corresponds to a different 
regression. Regression (1) uses the composite profit efficiency measure as a proxy for managerial 
efficiency. Regressions (2), (3), and (4) do the same using non-standard profit, revenue, and cost 
efficiencies, respectively.
Managerial efficiency is negatively related to bank failures. The coefficients for profit (columns 1 
and 2) and revenue efficiency measures (column 3) are significant and negative. Contrary to Wheelock 
and Wilson (2000), the coefficient associated with cost efficiency (column 4) is insignificant. Since 
our study covers a different sample period it indicates a shift in bank managerial strategies during the 
past decade. Relatively more revenue- and profit-efficient banks have a lower probability of failure.
The qualitative results regarding the proxies for the other CAMELS ratings are robust across the 
four specifications. Robustness checks (not reported) including different sets of explanatory varia-
bles give similar results. As expected, non-performing loans and loan loss provisions are positively 
related to bank failure probabilities. Further, banks whose loans represent a high proportion of their 
assets are also more likely to fail. Real estate loans and commercial and industrial loans increase the 
probability of bank failures. In addition, off-balance sheet activities, which were prominent in recent 
discussions on risk-taking behavior at banks, are unrelated to the bank failure probability. This latter
Table I: Time-to-Failure Hazard Regressions: Left-hand-side Variable is Time-to-Failure.
RHSV (1) (2) (3) (4)
Equity/Assets
6.469 9.414 6.534 6.507
(1.61) (2.28)* (1.67) (1.61)
Total Loans/Assets
5.483 5.24 5.341 5.473
(5.09)** (4.80)** (4.96)** (5.08)**
Real Estate Loans/Total Loans
11.219 10.49 10.898 11.149
(6.50)** (6.21)** (6.45)** (6.51)**
Business Loans/ Total Loans
8.954 8.178 8.604 8.904
(4.66)** (4.31)** (4.57)** (4.67)**
Other Real Estate Owned
-0.791 2.723 -0.408 -1.142
(0.15) (0.53) (0.08) (0.22)
15 http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp
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RHSV (1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Performing Loans
21.091 20.801 20.924 21.418
(10.14)** (9.33)** (10.30)** (10.47)**
Return on Equity
-0.968 -0.777 -0.934 -0.996
(4.19)** (3.23)** (4.12)** (4.36)**
Liquidity Creation
1.28 0.989 1.247 1.314
(2.31)* (1.79) (2.26)* (2.36)*
Off-Balance Sheet Activities
0.827 1.051 1.282 1.327
(0.61) (0.76) (0.97) (0.92)
Log(Assets)
0.234 0.253 0.232 0.227
(2.38)* (2.48)* (2.36)* (2.32)*
Composite Profit Efficiency
-0.026
(4.32)**
NSPF Efficiency
-1.005
(2.73)**
Revenue Efficiency
-5.67
(2.28)*
Cost Efficiency
1.623
(1.1)
Observations 39593 39357 39593 39593
Number of Banks 6778 6728 6778 6778
Bank failures 241 236 241 241
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table II: Time-to-Failure Hazard Regressions: Left-hand-side Variable is Time-to-Failure.
RHSV (1) (2) (3) (4)
Equity/Assets
6.764 9.659 6.99 6.78
(1.64) (2.33)* (1.74) (1.64)
Total Loans/Assets
5.181 4.852 4.948 5.168
(4.74)** (4.38)** (4.51)** (4.72)**
Real Estate Loans/Total Loans
11.475 10.603 11.105 11.37
(6.56)** (6.28)** (6.53)** (6.57)**
Business Loans/ Total Loans
9.132 8.204 8.711 9.05
(4.69)** (4.31)** (4.58)** (4.69)**
Other Real Estate Owned
0.675 3.954 1.387 0.46
(0.12) (0.73) (0.26) (0.08)
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RHSV (1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan Loan Provision
24.82 29.94 29.072 24.949
(1.83) (2.07)* (2.29)* (1.95)
Non-Performing Loans
17.053 15.699 16.355 17.466
(6.03)** (5.01)** (6.04)** (6.32)**
Return on Equity
-0.801 -0.57 -0.72 -0.822
(2.96)** (2.02)* (2.72)** (3.10)**
Funding Liquidity
1.319 1 1.284 1.351
(2.40)* (1.81) (2.34)* (2.44)*
Off-Balance Sheet Activities
0.638 1.099 1.204 1.185
(0.46) (0.79) (0.9) (0.81)
Log(Assets)
0.231 0.253 0.229 0.225
(2.35)* (2.49)* (2.32)* (2.29)*
Composite Profit Efficiency
-0.028
(4.59)**
NSPF Efficiency
-1.194
(3.29)**
Revenue Efficiency
-6.946
(2.79)**
Cost Efficiency
1.698
(1.13)
Observations 39593 39357 39593 39593
Number of Banks 6778 6728 6778 6778
Bank failures 241 236 241
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
result is robust to different measures of off-balance sheet activities.
The coefficient associated with funding liquidity (total loans/ total assets) is positive and significant 
across all regressions. A higher coefficient implies a higher probability of failure. Thus, it indicates 
that banks that heavily rely on short-term funding are more likely to fail. It also may indicate that 
deposit insurance increases the banks’ incentive to fund their operations using short-term borrowing.
We also conducted some robustness checks using static classification models (Probit and Tobit). 
The results for the Probit model are reported in Table III (The logit models give almost identical re-
sults). In those regressions all efficiency measures are significant and negatively associated with the 
probability of bank failure. However, as pointed out above, given the superior properties of hazard 
models to estimate the risk of failure, we favor the results presented in Tables I and II.
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Overall our empirical evidence support our main hypothesis. Managerial efficiency, as proxied 
by profit efficiency, is positively correlated with the probability of bank failures and has independent 
explanatory power beyond the traditional factors associated with bank failures—CAMELS factors.
5. Conclusions
As a consequence of the 2007-2009 U.S. financial crisis, 322 U.S. commercial banks failed between 
2008 and 2010. According to the FDIC estimates, both the number of bank failures and their associ- 
ated cost increased tenfold compared to the years between 2000 and 2007. Despite the severity of 
the recent crisis, the number of bank failures was low compared to previous decades. For instance, 
from 1980 to 1989, 1,467 U.S. commercial banks failed, and from 1990 to 1999 this number was 436. 
The natural question arising from these facts is what was different this time around.
In this paper we investigate the role played by managerial efficiency in the non-systemic bank 
failures during the crisis and compare our empirical results to those available for previous waves of 
bank failures in the U.S.. Using data from 2001 to 2010, we show that profit efficiency—our proxy 
for managerial efficiency— is a robust predictor of the ability of a bank to survive the crisis. As 
expected, traditional measures used in the literature as proxies for CAMELS components are highly 
Table III: Probit Regressions: Left Hand Side Variable is Failure.
RHSV (1) (2) (3) (4)
Equity/Assets
3.121 3.36 3.178 2.983
(4.18)** (4.40)** (4.30)** (4.01)**
Total Loans/Assets
2.631 2.62 2.569 2.696
(14.08)** (13.89)** (13.78)** (14.47)**
Real Estate Loans/Total Loans
2.931 2.744 2.926 2.9
(11.92)** (11.52)** (11.93)** (11.92)**
Business Loans/ Total Loans
2.712 2.456 2.693 2.663
(9.57)** (8.88)** (9.56)** (9.43)**
Other Real Estate Owned
0.024 -1.386 0.092 -0.438
(0.02) (0.92) (0.06) (0.3)
Non Performing Loans
9.671 7.878 9.5 9.624
(14.31)** (9.65)** (14.06)** (14.19)**
Return on Equity
-0.001 -0.149 -0.001 0
(0.24) (2.19)* (0.25) (0.2)
Liquidity Creation
0.46 0.38 0.44 0.47
(4.03)** (3.38)** (3.85)** (4.22)**
Off-Balance Sheet Activities
0.053 0.376 0.233 -0.256
(0.23) (1.63) (0.99) (1.04)
Log(Assets)
0.02 0.032 0.017 0.028
(1.21) (1.89) (1) (1.64)
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RHSV (1) (2) (3) (4)
Composite Profit Efficiency
-0.01
(2.34)*
NSPF Efficiency
-0.596
(6.84)**
Revenue Efficiency
-2.248
(3.75)**
Cost Efficiency
-0.902
(3.77)**
Constant
-8.977 -8.81 -6.908 -8.151
(12.45)** (11.99)** (7.88)** (10.38)**
Observations 46549 46258 46549 46549
Number of Banks 7361 7320 7361 7361
Bank failures 291 283 291 291
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
correlated with the probability of bank failures. After controlling for these factors, we find that profit 
efficiency has additional explanatory power and should be taken into account in studies investigating 
the determinants of bank failures.
In contrast to previous crises, this time around cost efficiency was unrelated to bank failures. 
During previous waves of bank failures, cost-inefficient banks and banks with relatively less capital 
or low-quality assets were more likely to fail. We find, however, that during the recent crisis capital 
adequacy lost importance in predicting non-systemic bank failures, while loan quality remained a 
strong predictor. Our results suggest that profit efficiency can be an important managerial indicator 
in monitoring the quality of managerial practices and the overall soundness of U.S. commercial banks. 
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A. Appendix
Banks maximize profits, П = R − C = ∑m pmym − ∑j wj x j, subject to technological and market con- stra-
ints, where pm, m = 1, • • • , M are prices of output ym and wj, j = 1, • • • , J are prices of inputs xj.
The Lagrangian associated with the profit maximization problem is:
(2) 
Defining p* = p • ŋ and x* = x • Ø , the first order conditions (FOCs) for pm and x j are:
(3)
(4)
From (3) we get:
(5)
Likewise, from (4) one gets:
(6)
Since x j does not appear in (5) and pm always appears along ŋ , one can solve for ŋ pm together 
with the price opportunity set g (ŋ • p, w) = 1 in terms of w and y. Hence, ŋ pm = p*m = Ø (w,ŷ) , ŷ = ym/y1. 
This expression relates optimal prices to output quantities and input prices.
Likewise, since p does not appear in (6) and xj always appears along Ø, one can solve for Øxj toge-
ther with the transformation function Af (y, Ɵ • x) = 1 in terms of w and y. Hence, Ɵxj = x* = ш (ŵ, y). 
This expression represents the conditional input factor demands.
The solutions of optimal input quantities and output prices can be used to compute the CNSPF as:
(7)
(8)
max L = П + y [A f (y, Ɵ • x) − 1] + µ [g (ŋ • p, w) − 1]
p,x
-wj+ 
y ·A
pm ym
wj xj
p1 y1
w1 x1
=0
=
=
A 
   m : 2, ···, M.
A 
   j : 2, ···, J.
ðf ( y, Ɵ • x)  ðx*j
ðlng (ŋ · p,w)
ð lnf (y, Ɵ ·x)
ðlng (ŋ · p,w)
ð lnf (y, Ɵ ·x)
ðx*j
ð ln p*m
ð ln x*j
ð ln p*1
ð ln x*1
xj
ym+ µ =0
ðg (ŋ • p, w)  ðp*m
ðp*m pm
A
πcns p f (w, y) = ∑ pm(•)ym − ∑ wj xj (•) = 1/ŋ ∑ pm(•) ŋ ym − 1/Ɵ ∑ wj xj (•) Ɵ
π cns pf (w, y) = 1/ŋ R(w, y) − 1/Ɵ C (w, y)
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Equation (8) shows that profits can be lower than optimal due to both technical and price inef- 
ficiencies16. Technical inefficiency increases costs (cost inefficiency) and price inefficiency lowers 
revenues (revenue inefficiency).
Profit efficiency from a non-standard profit function are obtained by estimating equation (8) 
making it equal to π ns p f = π optimal × e−γ . Where γ capture profit inefficiency.
By definition:
(9)
(10)
Therefore, the dollar-value profit inefficiency is given by
(11)
Where П* and П are optimal and current profits, respectively. The composite profit efficiency 
measure we use in this paper is given by П/П*.
16 Price inefficiency refers to setting output prices below optimal levels.
R = ∑ pmym = 1/ŋ ∑ p*m ym = 1/ŋ R* ≤ R*
C = ∑ wj xj = 1/Ɵ ∑ wj x*j = 1/ƟC * ≥ C *
П*−П= R* (1 − 1/ŋ) − C*(1 − 1/Ɵ)
